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In this paper we::r:":rr**, a fingerprint
for identifuing remote operating system as a proof-of-
concept. Passive operating system detection is the art
of detecting the operating system of other pC remotely
without its lenowledge. In order to achieve this goal the
detection process should be fast enaugh qnd reliable
whereby the prediction possibilities should narrow
down to match the mast proper operating system.
POSFinger is the sofiware that utilizes the idea of
passive operating system fingerprinting by mapping
the active methods to be mapped passively to achievi
better performance and reliable prediction.
Maintaining a secure operating system presents agreat challenge for any security or network
administrator.
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l.Introduction
When a user takes illegal control ovsr any
information system, this consider as intrusion.
Whether or not the action is harmftl, it is of concern
because it might cause instability to the system or the
services provided by the system, and since today's
systems consist of multiple nodes executing multiple
operating systems in a form of single distributed
system, this only changes the complexity, but not the
fundamental problems.
In fact, intnrsion is not a problem that caa be solved
once; continual aware is required. Complete physical
isolation of a system *om all is possible, but it may be
unacceptable. Other approaches cannot be used
because they are in conflict with other service. It is
typically that the operating system does have
vulnerabilities that can be exploited. New
wlnerabilities discovered daily in each operating
system upgrade. Patching the system could eliminate
known wlnerabilities. And some would prevent
desired functionality. Even though black hat user's
attempts to exploit security wlnerabilities in both the
operating system (OS) and the applications running on
top of it.
To date, system administrators have relied on
vendor patches to ensure the safety of there systems
but these fixes are seldom available in a timely fashion
and fixing one problem often creates new ones. [3].
Black hat users require operating Systems information
and the patch level as first step in gaining control of
the remote host. And thus, Understanding how to
obtain remote OS information is the key to protect it.
Detecting remote operating system could be the first
step in building a stronger intruder detection system or
honeyNet, recalling the fact that most of the security
holes depends on the operating system version running
on the host, then its wise enough to know how to patch
or how to protect the system from illegal users since
they could reach that point of detecting the operating
system and thus detecting system vulnerabilities [l].
2. Related Work
Many techniques available for fingerprint network
stack, Basically, each operating system has different
behavior then others in terms of packet content and
fields values; and thus by looking for these different
behaviors among operating systems and building a
database for these differences will absolutely narrow
down the operating system estimations very tightly.
There are only two techniques in OS fingerprinting;
Active and passive techniques.
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For Active techniques, all previous work consider
active tools such as Nmap in 12,3,4,51 results in
categorizing Nmap into "random scan" and "exploits
plus". NMAP is a network exploration tool and
security scanner that can find all open ports and detects
the OS on hosts within an IP address range. Franck
Veysset in [6] identify RING tools to one of the
unique tools because it uses only one open port and a
standard TCP packets instead of malformed packets to
avoid machine disturbance and make it impossible to
be detected by any IDS system, and give it the stealth
nature. QUESO as described in [7] is a port scanner
and operating system detection tool that usually sends
out seven packets at a time. QUESO sets the SYN I
FIN flags to tell the receiving computer to OPEN and
CLOSE a connection once.
From the other side a passive OS fingerprinting
tools such as pOf [8] consider as a tool to identiff the
operating system by examining packets being passed
over the local network, without sending any packets. It
can identify the operating systom on machines that
connect to your box (SYN mode), machines you
connect to (SYN+ACK mode), machine you cannot
connect to (RST+ mode), and machines whose
communications you can observe. Preston Wood in [9]
describe a passive IP discovery and fingerprinting
utility designed to sit on segments distributed
throughout a network to discover unique IP's on the
network. In addition to IP discovery disco has the
ability to passively fingerprint TCP SYN packets and
TCP SYNACK packets.Ettercap is another tool
developed by Alberto Ornaghi, Marco Valleri. It is a
suite for man-in-the-middle attacks on LAN. It features
sniffrng of live connections, content filtering on the fly
and many other interesting tricks. It supports active
and passive dissection of many protocols (even
ciphered ones) and includes many features for network
and host analysis.
As a result of these various tools, it is concluded
that Ring takes long time for identification compared
to NMAP. Moreover Ring tool need certain initialized
parameter in order to operate; such as the target host IP
address, an open por! the scanner machine IP address
and of course the network interface to be scanned .
Nmap still in active nature which is detectable by any
firewall that can banned it, moreover Nmap require a
good conditions to perform the test such as one opened
TCP port, one closed one and a closed UDP port.
sprint contains advanced banner grapping functionality
which could be disabled by the administrator in
addition to the active nature of the tool itself. And as a
result, a POSFinger is a combination between both
active and passive techniques to work in passive nature
for more accurate and less false positive detection
results, in the coming section the POSFinger system
component description will be endorsed.
3. Passive OS Fingerprinting
Instead ofcrafting packets, listening and capturing
packets during normal communication is the core of
passive OS identification. Analyzing the captured
packets will help in determining the operating system
that creates those packets. In contrast with active OS
fingerprinting that is based on sending crafted packets
to motivate the host to reply. Two states considered for
better results in identiffing the OS; the normal
connection request and the connection establish
request.
Figure 1: main component
3.1 Normal Connection Request
Detailed information must be collected from
captured packets such as Window size, TTL, ToS, and
DF values to minimize the possibilities of the
fingerprint. To assist in constructing a proper format
to be maintained into a tree data structure format for
fast matching. And since the TTL is not constant
because it depends on the hops number it passes a
temporary matching could be accepted but not to
ignore the accuracy of matching; this is where the Host
Path Projection take place by projecting the path after
applying the common rules whenever it comes to TTL
lll
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values; The rule of thumb when dealing with TTL
values is :
(mtnTTL > currentTTL < maxTTL +l\.
Packet information received from www.lib.usm.mv
Window: 9ll2 I TTL:232 I ToS:0 / DF: ON
TCP SYN+ACK packets, as these have the greatest
number of unique identifiers. The fields used to make
this determination are (Initial TTL, Don't Fragment
flag, Initial SYN Packet Size, and TCP Options, such
as Window Size, MSS Size, Nop Option, Window
Scaling Option and SackOK Option).
4.1. Analysis of TCP Options values.
This example from a SYN packet generated from
Windows 98 box ltol
Table 2 TCP Filed
Considering another example of a SYN packet content
from OpenBSD 2.7 box
Table 3: Samole TCP Ontion Fields
<mss l460,nop,nop,sackOK,nop,wscale
0,nop,nop,timestamp 50473 0>
The following describes the additional 16 bytes of
fields used in this sample. Otrers I byte of padding.
The operating system supports the Window Scale
option but it is not used. This takes up 3 bytes.
<nop,nop> supplies 2 bytes of padding. <timestamp
504'73 0> is the first timestamp. The Timestamp
Value field is set to 5M73. The Timestamp Echo
Reply field is set to 0 since this is the initial packet.
The ti takes l0
In order to achieve a better comparison between
different OpenBSD X boxes another example captured
from OpenBSD 2.9, which produce no TCp option
values as follow:
Table 1: host
TTL values TTL Good Match
32 a -32
64 33-64
128 65 - 128
255 129 -255
Suppose a packet with TTL value of 232, by
comparing this value against the table above, we will
see that 232 is between ,29 
- 
255 and then the
corresponding approximate TTL value is 255 which
will give a match for ( x86 Solaris Operating System(Solaris,x86,9ll2,255,0,l) ). The solution is not to
relay on a single field value, whereas relaying on
multiple fields value is more reliable and will to
naffow down the operating system guessing
possibilities. And thus a file with known OS
fingerprint matches is maintained within the system. In
summary a combination of Window, TTL, TOS, and
DF will be tracked to perform matching and to narrow
down the possibility of guessing the operating system,
at least one TCP packet and one Ip packet needed in
order to gather the necessary information.
3.2 Connection Establish request (3-way
handshaking)
It is not necessary that all packets contain the same
fields of information. Once the fields are extracted
{window size f time to live f maximum segment size f
don't fragment fiaS I window scaling I sackOK JIag I
ry1n flas I packet size\ rhe proper OS fingerprintingfile is loaded to perform matching against it. Basically
both cases are the same but differ in the number of
fields used and the format.
4. Passive Operating System ldentification
(POSFinger)
Recalling that Passive Operating System
identification relies on the fact that each operating
system TCPAP stacks implementation differs slightly.
This is most accurately done by analyzing TCp SyN,
n2
<mss 1 460,nop,nop,sackOK>
4500 0030 aelT 4000 8006 f398 xxxx xxxx )ryryyyyyy 0c37 0015 0526 a98f 0000 0000 7002 trff
6f06 0000 0204 0sb4 0l0l 0402
Maximum Segment Size (MSS): 4 bytes
Window Scale (WSCALE): 3 bytes
Timestamp (TS): l0 bytes
No Operation (NOP): I byte
Selective Acknowledgment Permitted (SackOK): 2
bytes
Selective Acknowledgment Data: l0 bytes (plus 8
lyqgs for each additional pair of sequence numbers)
159
Table 4: Sample Packet Format
<1145: P 3066603742:3066603806(il)
ack 1646168027 win 17520 [tos 0x10]>
t4510 0068 7eB7 4000 4006 3862 c0a8
011e c0a8 0128 0016 0479 b6c8 aSde
621e 87db 5018 4470 1813 0000 e492
152t 23c3 8a2b 4ee7 dbf8 0d48 88e8
0110 2b01 4295 39f4 52c9 a05b 31d7
e3ae 1c62 2dbd d955 d604 b5d2 63d1
Bfbc 4ab7 1615 b382 571c 70e0 a368
a03f 425b 6211
o The P, ack, and 1646168027 ne TCP flags.
o The 3066603742:3066603806(64) is the byte
sequence/range.
r The win 17520 indicates the window size in
bytes that the sender is presently ready to
receive.
o The [tos 0xl0] is the TCP type of service-
Another example of a SYN packet content from a
RedHat Linux 7.0 system is <mss 1460, sackOK,
timestamp 123265 0, nop, wscale 0>. This example
also employs the same 4 options at the beginning
which is used by the previous examples. The
difference in this example is the arrangements of the
fields in a dissimilar way. And thus, the operating
system has the ability to specify the order of the TCP
options fields.
4.2. The Proposed Fingerprints and their
Meanings
After reviewing some famous passive operating
system detection tools, POSFinger comes up with new
strategy in matching against fingerprints and
identifying operating systems by considering three
different states:
4.2.1 SYN Fingerprint.
Defining the TCP SYN Packets as the default mode
of the fingerprinting operation, because SYN Packets
are rich in information which are operating system
dependant such as
. Window size (WSS) 
-The value defined
depends on the system itself where it could be
fixed value, multiple of MSS or MTU (MSS +
40), or random numbers.
. Initial TTL 
- 
The real TTL value is determine
once a packet is received.
. Maximum segment size (MSS) 
- 
This setting
is used to identiff the link type of the remote
host.
. Window Scaling (WSCALE) 
- 
Some system
uses this to scale WSS which is able to
lengthen the TCP/P window size about 32
bits.
r Timestamp 
- 
In some cases the initial SYN is
setto zero if the timestamp feature is used.
. Selective ACK permitted 
- 
To implement this
function a flag is set.
' NOP option - This is used as a separator
between different option values to indicate the
sequence of these values.
' EOL option * Normally the system uses NOP
option to pad at the end of the packet and the
EOL option is rarely used.
r13
Figure 2: fingerprinting cases
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able 5: SYN Fingerprint Format
Wslttl 
I D lsslOPT,... IOS I Detaits
WS - window size.
ttl - initiatrrl.
D - doa't frangment bit (0 
- 
not set, 1 
-ser).SS - overall SyN packet size.
OpT - option value and order specification.
OS - os Name.
Details - OS description.
Where the OPT is a comma separ-GdlEiandToutd-
take the following format,
NOP - Nop option
EOL - EoL option
WX - window scaling option with value X.MX - maximum segment size option with value X.
SACKOK - selective AcK oK
T _ timestamp
65535112811 l4SlM.,NOp,NoplwindowsPooo spa. xp spr
4.2.2 SYN + ACK Fingerprint
- 
The other way to idartify the TCp/Ip signature
from the packets sent out (SyN + ACK packeti). The
SYN + ACK fingerprint depends on the SyN value in
some cases. If the SYN has enabled the extensions
such as IRFCI323], IRFC2OI8] and [RFCI644], then
only it could be revealed. In some cases the WSS value
is duplicated from the SYN packets so a different WSS
value is used to test this kind of values. The proposed
fingerprint for these packets as follow:
4.2.3 General Fingerprint.
Another way to identify TCPAP signature, by
considering the normal communication and investigate
the content of interchanged packets. It is not accurate
as much as the previous two techniques, the result
could be near to prediction and more then one possible
guess could be displayed instead ofthe exact one. Each
fingerprint consists of one line, depending on the
packet type, the fingerprint format as follow.
The default state is the SYN fingerprint which is
the accurate guess, then the SYN+ACK then the
general fingerprint which is the least accurate among
all these states.
5. Result and discussion
An analysis of five different operating systems is
conducted which are:
5.1 Linux Box.
Let's Consider the SYN packet contents of a Linux
2.4 openting system to identify the OS. There are two
cases for this identification:
Case 1: Lilnlux 2.4 uses 5840 bytes as its initial
Window size which is different compared to Linux
Table 6: SYN+
tt4
TCP - TCp protocot.
Len - Packet Length.
ttl - initiatTTL.
df - don't frangment bit (0 
- 
not set, 1 +et).
Type - Packet type (SYN,ACK,SYN+ACK)
window - windowsize.
TCPOP - TCp Options-if avaitabte
OS - os Name.
Where TCPOP is a comma separated list and
could take the following format,
NOP - NoP option
EOL - EoL oprion
WX - window scaling option with value X.
MX - maximum segment size op$on with value
X.
SACKOK - selectiveACK OK
r prc o.:..s,ylJ+$CK Fingerprint Format
Wslftt lDlsslOpT,...lOSlDetails
Ws -windowsize.
ttl - initialrrL.
D - don't frangment bit (0 
- 
not set, 1 +et).SS - overall SyN packet size.OPT - option value and order specification.OS -oS Name.
Details - oS description.
Where the OOO is a comma separateO tist anO coulO-
take the following format,
NOP - NOP optionEOL - EOL optionWX - window scaling option with value X.MX - maximum segment size option with value X.SACKOK - selective ACK OKT - timestamp
655951 1?q1q4l M", N oP, w0, NoP@
ows12000 SP4 32736164l0l44lM.lLinuxl2.4
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kemel 2.2 that uses 32120 as its initial Window stze.
Linux kernel 2.2 and2.4 uses default TTL value which
is 64.
The following TCP Options are used by default by
Liutx2.4 and2.2 as shown in the figure above.
o Maximum Segment Size (MSS)
r Selective Acknowledgment OK (sackOK)
o Timestamp
o Window Scale, and Nop
As discussed above, the TCP Option fields contribute
to the total length of a packet that could assist in
determining an OS type. The total length of the packet
shown in the figure above is 60 bytes' Thus, Linux is
easy to be identified as it is the only OS that contains
total header length of60 bYtes.
Case 2: Putting Linux Fingerprinting Together:
As a result. the characteristic listed below recognizes
only one Operating System which is Linux.
o TTL:64
o Windows:5840
o TCP Options: Sets MSS, TimestamPs,
sackO[ wscale and I noP
o Packet Length: 60
5.2 OPENBSD Box
The following describes on the OpenBSD
characteristics.
o TTL: 64. This value alone will not help to
detect OpenBSD.
o Window Size: 16384. This value is also used
by other oPerating systems.
o TCP Options: Uses the same options as Linux
but instead of setting one nop' OpenBSD uses
5 nops
o Total Packet Length: 64 Bytes. This is a key
indicator.
As a result, a system which uses OpenBSD can be
identified by using the characteristics listed above.
5.3 SOLARIS 7
Solaris can be identified easily by using its initial
TTL field. The figure below shows the packet contents
of a Solaris 7 operating system. The following list the
characteristics of the Solaris 7 operating system.
r TTL:255
o Window Size: 8760
r TCP Options: MSS
. IP ID: Increments by one ALL of the time.
r Total Packet Length:44 bYtes
A Solaris packet can be identified by using both the
TTL value which is 255 and the total packet length
which is 44 bytes.
5.4 ArX 4.3.
The following list the characteristics of an AIX 4.3.
r TTL: 64. Resembles Linux and OpenBSD
o Window: 16384. Resembles Windows 2000
r TCP Options: MSS. Like Solaris
o Packet Length: 44 bytes. Like Solaris.
As a result, the AIX 4.3 operating system can be
identified by comparing with the characteristics listed
above.
5.5 Window 2000
The following list the characteristics of Window 2000
operating system.
o TTL: 128. Nearly all Windows Operating
systems uses this TTL value.
o Window: 16384 - Like AIX 4.3
o TCP Options: MSS, sackOK, 2 noPs
As a result, Window 2000 packet can be identified by
using the packet length along with the TTL value to
assist in giving an accurate result.
The accuracy in detection summarized in the following
table
r15
Time Number of Packets Accuracy
0 6 50o/o
20 12 51%
30 18 52o/o
40 24 7Oolo
50 30 71o/o
60 36 72o/o
70 42 72%
80 48 73o/o
90 il 73o/o
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OS dlbcto|r Accuecy
+6
*j. 12
18
24
+30
+30
Time Numboro{pack€{s Accrxacy
pNilDC!|r -4- 5,1
6. Conclusion
POSFinger is utilizing the idea of Active Operating
System fingerprinting by investigating the fingerprint
signature that active tools used such as NMAp, and
enhancing this fingerprint signature by eliminating the
non-operating system dependant fields such as the Ip
options field, the type of service field, and the
identification filed, by this POSFinger minimize the
time of comparison by reducing nurnber of parameter
to compare against.
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